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Big Data Surveillance and the Body-subject 
Abstract 
This paper considers the implications of big data practices for theories about the surveilled subject 
who, analysed from afar, is still gazed upon, although not directly watched as with previous 
surveillance systems. We propose this surveilled subject be viewed through a lens of proximity 
rather than interactivity, to highlight the normative issues arising within digitally mediated 
relationships. We interpret the ontological proximity between subjects, data flows and big data 
surveillance through Merleau-Ponty’s ideas combined with Levinas’ approach to ethical proximity 
and Coeckelberg’s work on proximity in the digital age. This leads us to highlight how competing 
normativities, and normative dilemmas in these proximal spaces, manipulate the surveilled 
subject’s embodied practices to lead the embodied individual towards experiencing them in a local 
sense. We explore when and how the subject notices these big data practices and then interprets 
them through translating their experiences into courses of action, inaction or acquiescence. 
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With the world’s media hailing the present as ‘the Age of Big Data’ this article considers its 
implications for theories of the surveilled subject.1 Big data describes a range of socio-technical 
and commercial trends resulting in the storage, analysis and further usage of huge amounts of data 
generated by social networks and mobile devices. While both public and private sector 
organizations seek to capitalize on big data analytics to improve products and services, the data 
flows which feed big data originate in the mundane, everyday online activities of millions of 
people. This renders the everyday subject ‘surveilled’ by definition, yet it is difficult for the subject 
to comprehend exactly how to evade, resist or negotiate big data practices as – strictly speaking, 
in terms of embodied practices – there is nobody directly watching them. Ultimately, the data 
scientists and business people who interpret the results of big data analysis are very far removed 
from the individuals who provide the data. Recent debates around big data practices in fields as 
diverse as higher education, energy consumption and health, however, highlight moral questions 
relating to the ‘harvesting’ of data from individuals by companies to feed their big data activities. 
We take these concerns as a cue and propose a shift in how the surveilled subject is theorized in 
this setting. Rather than focus on Foucauldian treatments of surveillance, which assume a direct 
gaze as their central feature, we suggest an alternative approach based on the notion of intersecting 
proximities – rather than relationalities – between subjects, each other and big data surveillance 
practices. While Foucault’s later work began to address more closely the problematic of the 
subject, we feel that even these perspectives recursively return to questions of institutions and 
‘governmentality’, which occur at a more macro level of analysis and do not offer sufficient 
explanatory power for our purposes. Having said this, we acknowledge recent work such as that 
of Btihaj Ajana (2012) who skilfully connects governmentality with the local in the context of 
biometrics. 
Instead we propose an approach to the surveilled subject which is founded on a notion of proximity 
rather than interactivity with surveillance. We use Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) posthumous work to 
establish ontological proximity between subjects, data flows and big data surveillance. We then 
draw on Levinas’ approach to ethical proximity in conjunction with Coekelberg’s work on 
proximity in the digital age, to highlight the normative issues which arise in digitally mediated 
human relations. Accordingly, competing normativities circulate in these proximal spaces between 
subjects, others and big data users. For example, normativities about the ethics of interpersonal 
relations, perhaps concerning care, communication and self-expression on the one hand, and 
ontological consumercentred normativities about convenience, customization, economy or value, 
on the other. At the intersection of competing normative codes, we predict that the normative 
dilemmas inherent within the politics of proximity will be felt, lived and experienced by the 
embodied subject in rich and interesting ways. 
In order to map the traces of lived surveilled subjectivity, we propose a research agenda 
investigating how individuals negotiate, experience and feel these moral dilemmas in a very local 
sense. We argue that coming to terms with big data surveillant subjectivity involves recognizing 
not just the presence of a data flow about one’s activity but the avowed manipulations of embodied 
practice through the circulation of competing normativities which occurs. We question the points 
at which, and under what conditions they are noticed and what pragmatic courses of embodied 
action, inaction or acquiescence result. The article begins with a discussion of big data and its 
origins, with some examples from current debates surrounding it. We then build our theory of the 
surveilled subject and propose some conclusions around how this might be explored empirically. 
‘Big Data’: The Terms of Reference 
Big data is defined as ‘high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets that demand 
cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and decision 
making’ (Gartner, 2013). The concept emerged as a label to describe a number of factors around 
the changing landscape of commercial and government data collection, use and application. 
Following the expansion of eCommerce in the early 2000s, businesses realized they had huge 
information resources about their operations that could reveal new insights about how best to 
compete (Degli Esposti, 2014). Information about customer purchase patterns, sales, their business 
and supply chain partners, and sentiment analyses from social media data became cheaper to store 
and exploit using new analytical techniques (Jacobs, 2009). New types of business activity 
emerged: some companies were very effective at analysing their own datasets while others (notably 
consultancies) offered analytical services to those companies who were less adept at data analysis 
(Davenport and Harris, 2007). A lucrative market for data has also emerged, where firms sell 
datasets about potential customers, customer profiles and their creditworthiness (among other 
things) to those who require them. While data use by corporations was once a means to an end, a 
mechanism for generating more value from customers, for some companies, such as Google, 
Facebook, Twitter and others, the collection of data has become an ‘end in itself’. The NSA 
(National Security Agency), for example, recently completed a new data centre with an assumed 
capacity of 12 exabytes, or 12 trillion megabytes of data (Hill, 2013). By comparison, researchers 
have suggested that a theoretical recording of all human speech ever would require only five 
exabytes (Klinkenborg, 2003). 
A key component of any big data strategy is to generate what is termed ‘actionable insight’ for 
firms using it (Degli Esposti, 2014). Particularly in marketing settings, the object is to leverage 
insight about consumers gleaned from data in order to ‘persuade’ (or manipulate) them into buying 
a product or using a service and to target marketing efforts more effectively. Sometimes data 
collection does not even require active use of a device by a person. Data collection is often 
automated and passive (Nunan and Di Domenico, 2013), created by automatic sensors in, for 
example, cell phones, water meters, cars and even buildings. Inferences about human behaviour 
are drawn from analysis of these data streams. Big data can simply be described as business 
intelligence on a grand scale, and the overwhelming focus on big data has been about the potential 
positive impacts on corporations and societies, primarily in terms of cost ‘efficiencies’ (Manyika 
et al., 2011). Some, however, have questioned its ethics given that it is so grounded in data streams 
taken from individuals as they use everyday technologies. By definition, this renders those whose 
data are incorporated in any big data activity a surveilled subject, compromises privacy2 and has 
broader social implications (boyd, 2010). It enables a creeping extension of both commercial and 
governmental surveillance into different aspects of the private sphere. One practical consequence 
of big data is the increasing reliance on algorithm-based analytics. This represents a shift away 
from segmenting or profiling an abstraction of individual characteristics into groups and a move 
towards predictive analytics, the use of continually adjusted quantitative models to predict human 
behaviour on an individual level. Such analytical techniques serve to enable surveillance of future 
behaviour – what Nigel Thrift calls ‘the political economy of propensity’ rather than current or 
past behaviour (Thrift, 2008; see also Palma˚s, 2010; Siegel, 2013). Because of ubiquitous media 
and its reliance on complex analytics to convey different messages to users, Savage (2013) has 
argued that these analytical methods now are the stuff of social life. They comprise modes of 
instantiating social relationships and are a form of bodily inscription, operating through new 
normativities and practices. Their instantaneity and ubiquity mean that data analytics are much 
more lively and ‘in-use’, rather than applied post-hoc to a dataset by a social scientist. In an 
everyday sense, these ethical questions are very salient given the expansion of big data into public 
interest settings, such as energy consumption, education and health. Here we see some tough 
questions being raised about individual privacy and surveillance exposure in the face of 
autonomous data streams which the individual cannot control. 
As part of smart city infrastructures (Klauser and Albrechtslund, 2014), for example, smart meters 
allow householders to analyse and hence manage their electricity consumption. However, this 
information is also available to electricity suppliers and other partners involved in smart city 
projects. Patterns of life within the home become visible in new ways. Legal scholars in both 
Europe and North America have begun to question the legalities of smart metering in relation to 
data protection legislation (Knyrim and Trieb, 2011; McNeil, 2011). At the same time electrical 
and software engineers are trying to find ways to protect the anonymity and unique electricity 
consumption footprints of those whose homes have smart meters (Efthymiou and Kalogridis, 
2010). 
The use of learning analytics in distance education is a similarly controversial area (Prinsloo and 
Slade, 2014). Universities use both raw and analysed data on student performance to guide the 
student through the learning process but also inform the university about the performance of 
cohorts and learning materials themselves. Slade and Prinsloo (2013) note that students rarely give 
informed consent for their data to be used in this way and feel uncomfortable with some aspects 
of the tracking involved. They argue that learning analytics lies at the conjunction of two separate 
sets of normativities: with education as an economic endeavour and as a process which promotes 
learning, understanding and self-improvement. 
Self-improvement is also a theme in the health field. Here, different body-worn devices have been 
available on the market for some time, linked to the growing ‘quantified self’ (QS) movement. 
Popular devices such as the Fitbit or Jawbone, which are worn on the wrist, enable the individual 
to create a picture of their activity over time. The business model of some of these organizations, 
including Fitbit, is to harvest individuals’ health data and then sell it on to health care providers 
for marketing purposes. For example Nafus and Sherman (2014) argue: 
The QS movement attracts the most hungrily panoptical of the data aggregation businesses in 
addition to people who have developed their own notions of analytics that are separate from, 
and in relation to, dominant practices of firms and institutionalized scientific production. (Nafus 
and Sherman, 2014: 2) 
Recently it was revealed that users’ Fitbits were automatically uploading data to the web 
concerning the details of when they had sex (Payne, 2014). Fitbit immediately rectified the problem 
by withdrawing the uploaded data from the public domain and advising users about privacy settings 
but the debate highlighted how these data, once shared, are completely out of the control of users. 
This concern expressed by Payne (2014) is similar to that expressed by the students in Slade and 
Prinsloo’s (2013) study and by smart metering engineers: that individuals can experience a lack of 
control over data collection, gathering and use, and were uncomfortable with their data being 
harnessed by third parties in a manner commensurate with big data practices.3 This uncertainty is 
magnified when multiple data sources can be combined to form new and previously unanticipated 
forms of surveillance. One example is when researchers used facial recognition techniques to 
combine public biographical data available via the LinkedIn social network with other public, but 
anonymous, photos from a major dating site (Acquisti et al., 2011). Another is the ability by which, 
given sufficient computing power and motivation, aggregated and anonymous data may be de-
anonymized, as happened with anonymized individual health records in the US (Ohm, 2010). 
Hence, while the term ‘big data’ may be relatively new, it does exhibit some continuities with 
surveillance practices; indeed, direct surveillance practices which occurred in the past. As 
Heilbroner (1967) noted, despite the excitement accompanying new technologies, they are 
typically incremental, especially when seen in retrospect. So it is with big data. While being 
presented as a fundamentally new organizational strategy, the technologies that drive big data can 
be seen as incremental in the context of the growth of information technology over the last four 
decades. Yet, looking beyond the volume of data, a key consequence of big data is the way it serves 
to break down boundaries between different sources of data, thus allowing the combination of 
information from different social domains. In describing big data, one must therefore separate the 
political discourse surrounding the concept from the technologies from which it arose. The 
promotion of policies around big data in ‘western’ contexts serves as an aspiration for the role of 
data in providing competitive advantage to economies and as a means of providing wider 
legitimacy to the continuing collection and combination of data. Thus, we are forced to ask what 
the ‘big’ in ‘big data’ refers to. While the etymology of the term encourages a focus on the volume 
of data, it refers in fact instead more to the ubiquity of data, the completeness of coverage over 
contemporary lives. It is this ubiquity, the knowledge of a near-complete record of individual lives, 
which removes the need for a priori decisions on commencing surveillance. In democracies, with 
clearer legal protections of the line between public and private, big data extends existing 
surveillance technologies in its ability to co-opt the key economic actors – the corporations – and 
thus gain a window into the private. The levels of ubiquity in terms of data collection, previously 
only available in tightly controlled political environments, are therefore now available universally. 
More than this, through the increasingly embedded role of online social networks and location-
sensitive mobile devices in social activity, the boundaries between surveillance and the surveilled 
subject become blurred. When specifically quizzed about some big data practices, as they were in 
the research cited above, subjects express familiar ethical concerns about privacy and surveillance. 
However, the question we are grappling with in this article is how we think about the surveilled 
subject for the rest of the time. In our view, big data succeeds in extending the scope of surveillance 
by co-opting individuals into de facto surveillance of their own private lives, offering a challenge 
to contemporary understandings of the surveilled subject. 
The Big Data Surveilled Subject 
With big data, the surveilled subject is now much more closely but sometimes unknowingly 
enmeshed in surveillance assemblages and subject to multiple lines of sight by virtue of the latter’s 
ubiquity. These lines of sight are embedded in the software applications associated with everyday 
electronic device use. When theorizing the surveilled subject this poses two challenges. The first 
is that, in contrast to surveillance practices in the workplace, or in public space using CCTV, the 
subject is not caught in a direct gaze. Instead they are enmeshed in a political – or political-
economic – relationship with those collecting and using data by virtue of the latter’s capacity for 
direct social shaping for economic gain. The second is that the surveillance to which they are 
subject arises in a milieu of other key connections, such as with friends, family, associates, 
employers, campaigning groups and gaming activities, that are mediated by the same electronic 
devices. To respond to such challenges we suggest that a new understanding of the surveilled 
subject has two elements. First, reflecting the indirectness of the big data surveillant gaze, our 
thinking is founded on the notion of proximity rather than interactivity with surveillant data flows. 
We outline how surveillant proximity is one of the many proximities in which subjects find 
themselves. We use the contrasting theoretical perspectives of Levinas and MerleauPonty to 
problematize proximity. Second, we suggest that understanding the normativities which circulate 
within these proximal relationships enables a tracing of moments of surveilled subjectivity within 
the flow of everyday life. We develop a research agenda based on embodied moments of noticing, 
the affective sensibilities and bodily inscriptions which engender a sense of everyday lived 
surveilled subjectivity. 
Proximal Surveillant Relations under Big Data 
We begin with the notion of proximity. Big data has engendered new social practices, which are 
designed to generate data but which also enmesh the subject in the surveillant assemblage by 
inscribing the body in new ways. So, for us, the concept of proximity does two things: first, it helps 
to encapsulate the background presence of data streams in everyday life and establishes an 
ontological proximity between the subject and big data surveillance, which is enacted through 
embodied practice. By extension, it locates the lived body as a central site of interest. Second, it 
allows us to refer to an ethical proximity concerning the normativities which surround the manner 
in which social relations are conducted in digitally mediated contexts. 
To delve further into this issue we first turn to the posthumously published work of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (1968), who elucidates the ontological proximities which we think might 
characterize an indirect surveillance relationship. In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty 
attempts to unpack the proximal relationship between the subject and the world, not only in terms 
of one’s visible presence within that world, but how one develops an ‘openness’ (1968: 37) towards 
that world when one is not actively engaged within it. Because of one’s capacity to perceive, reflect 
and then to reflect again upon one’s reflections (‘hyper-reflexivity’), he argues that objects as 
perceived by the subject are already overwritten with the body’s perceptual capacities.4 Indeed, 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the body: 
must plunge into the world instead of surveying it, it must descend toward it such as it is instead 
of working its way back up toward a prior possibility of thinking it – which would impose upon 
the world in advance the conditions for our control over it. (1968: 39) 
It is within these progressive immersive oscillations between the sensing body and the world that 
a space of connection emerges. As he beautifully states, this space is ‘a sort of straits between 
exterior horizons and interior horizons ever gaping open’ (1968: 132), thus establishing an idea of 
the embodied subject continually sensing, incorporating and constituting the world. Merleau-Ponty 
portrays the sensing body, palpating and co-creating the world, and proximity emerges as the 
qualitative connection between one’s own embodied perceptions and the worldly phenomena with 
which one acts and interacts, and on which one reflects. 
Therefore, one’s visible presence in the world is but one point in a complex existential process of 
reflection, hyper-reflection and engagement. But this ‘world’ is not a simple one, and to reduce 
perception to ‘brute vision’, as he terms it, is to miss a trick. MerleauPonty argues that to look at 
the world one must be part of that very world that one seeks to regard. One must coexist with the 
other(s). In The Visible and the Invisible, he explains: 
We understand then why we see the things themselves, in their places, where they are, according 
to their being which is indeed more than their being-perceived – and why at the same time we 
are separated from them by all the thickness of the look and of the body; it is that this distance 
is not the contrary of this proximity, it is deeply consonant with it, it is synonymous with it. It is 
that the thickness of the flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its 
visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of 
communication. (1968: 135) 
Proximity, then, is an embodied sense of nearness, a shared presence which is detected, perceived 
and incorporated by the subject in their lifeworld. Through the socio-technical practices which 
accompany big data, a connection-space, or chiasm, of various degrees of intensity, forms between 
the self and ontologically proximal data streams. For our purposes, the implication is that the 
subject does not have to be fully conscious of or interacting with a surveillant data stream to be 
subject to it. They can be living with – and through – its enablers and consequences in digital 
contexts. Affective and embodied consciousness of this shared presence can be raised within a 
research setting and this is our point of departure. 
Our next step is to consider how this ontological proximity to data streams might intersect with 
other proximities in the subject’s lifeworld. At this point we turn to Levinas so that we can begin 
to highlight how digitally mediated self–other relations, which also happen to feature surveillant 
data streams, are fraught with moral dilemmas and competing normativities. Levinasian proximity 
is different from the proximity described by Merleau-Ponty: it relates to the ethics inherent within 
self–other relations. Levinas (1996) explains proximity as referring to the already existing ethical 
responsibility that one has for the immediate others who surround one and for humanity itself. The 
other is characterized by the social and moral conditioning to which we have been subject 
throughout our lives and is always present to some degree within the self: 
Anarchically, proximity is a relationship with a singularity, without the mediation of any principle 
or ideality. It is the summoning of myself by the other (autrui), it is a responsibility toward those 
whom we do not even know. The relation of proximity does not amount to any modality of distance 
or geometrical contiguity, nor to the simple ‘representation’ of the neighbour. It is already a 
summons of extreme exigency, an obligation which is anachronistically prior to every engagement. 
An anteriority that is older than the a priori. (Levinas, 1996: 81) 
The notion of a morality that is inherent to being-in-the-world is discussed at length by Levinas 
(1989) in the essay ‘Is ontology fundamental?’ Here, he introduces the face, which appears 
throughout his work as the foundation of his ethics, particularly in Totality and Infinity (1969). For 
Levinas, the face represents the irreducible other (autrui) which signifies itself. Attempts to 
comprehend or signify the other against a ‘horizon of being’, in profile against and comparison 
with all being, are violent acts because of the partial negation of the face – that is, the irreducible 
being – of the other. That same partial negation also renders total dominance of the other, total 
enslavement, possession and, ultimately, murder, impossible within the realm of relationality. The 
face also does not exclusively refer to the human face. In a final essay ‘Peace and proximity’ 
(1996), Levinas implies that it can refer to different parts of the body, in their complex 
expressivities. He quotes from Vasily Grossman’s novel Life and Fate, a story of political detainees 
travelling to Moscow, having to queue, to make the point: 
[She] had never thought that the human back could be so expressive, and could convey states of 
mind in such a penetrating way. Persons approaching the counter had a particular way of 
craning their neck and their back, their raised shoulders with shoulder blades tense like springs, 
which seemed to cry, sob and scream. (1996: 167) 
When considered in these terms, it seems inappropriate to refer to an organization using big data 
techniques as a Levinasian ‘other’. Levinas’ analysis relates to direct, immediate relations between 
humans (Levinas, 1991). However we can see how big data practices are an instant moral problem 
from the Levinasian point of view. The surveilled subject is always seen in profile, against a 
‘horizon of being’, and hence surveillance is always going to be ethically and morally questionable 
because of its inherent reductionism. It is perhaps more appropriate, then, to consider the relevant 
relational contexts in which it arises. Interestingly, reductionism arises as an issue here as well. 
Coeckelberg (2011), in particular, outlines how proximity can be paradoxical. In examining mobile 
and online media, he critiques their claim to ‘connect’ people who are distant in space. This claim 
that one can keep up or even intensify existing connections, and start up new relationships, is a 
paradox in that the media that make it possible for relationships to be distant promote distance 
rather than proximity. ‘The paradox is that while presented as a solution to the problem of distance 
in the global village, it is at the same time its very condition’ (Coeckelberg, 2011: 133). It 
exacerbates the Levinasian paradox: that in digitally mediated relationships it is even more 
impossible to be ethically responsible for the other, and the presence of the face of the other – its 
irreducibility – reminds us of that impossibility and moral dilemmas abound. Levinas states: 
When I have grasped the other in the opening of being in general, as an element of the world 
where I stand, where I have seen him on the horizon I have not looked at him in the face, I have 
not encountered his face. The temptation of total negation, measuring the infinity of this attempt 
and its impossibility – this is the presence of the face. (1996: 9) 
For Levinas, it is the moral obligations that circulate between humans, and how those are enacted, 
which are important. It is these obligations which create ethical proximity, however problematic 
and impossible that may be. This is a critical point in our argument, because in our view the silent 
ubiquity of big data surveillance assemblages and the practices they engender can also carry and 
inscribe a moral message which intersects with an already existing digitally mediated human–
human relationality. The reductionism inherent in all forms of social relations is intensified in 
today’s digitally mediated world (Coeckleberg, 2011). Furthermore, the presence of digital data 
streaming from these activities into the hands of powerful corporations and governments places 
self–other relations in a double bind. Not only do they present a moral challenge to the way human 
beings relate to each other, the whole way of relating is opened up to surveillance by third parties, 
introducing more moral dilemmas (Sewell and Barker, 2006) and competing normativities. 
Competing Normativities 
A critical research nexus, then, concerns the normativities which circulate within this milieu, and, 
specifically, how these are lived and experienced by subjects. In big data surveillance, these 
normativities are carried by a hybrid array of humans and non-human materialities which represent 
the surveillance apparatus (Ball, 2002) and are inscribed through social practices of manipulating 
and using devices and their features which feed big data infrastructures. Indeed Klauser and 
Albrechstlund argue that normativity in big data settings arises from ‘the study and identification 
of different normalities’ (2014: 282) as they appear in data streamed from everyday settings. Thus, 
they cite examples from Smarter City projects which emphasize the pursuit of ‘connectivity’, 
‘digitization’ and ‘the intelligent response to needs’. They also cite examples from quantified self-
tools to be used for ‘self-improvement’, ‘greater productivity’ or ‘healthy living’. Each of these 
normalities is to be reinforced through the collection and analysis of data as digitally mediated 
everyday life unfolds. As they argue, the aim is: 
the management of multiplicities (of circulating people, of tracked activities, etc.) as a whole, 
through techniques that ‘work within reality, by getting the components of reality to work in 
relation to each other, thanks to and through a series of analyses and specific arrangements ..’ 
(2014: 282–3) 
Hence, these normativities concern how one should live one’s life in a way which is also readily 
encodable in data. This is the key to understanding – and theorizing – the experience of the 
surveilled subject in the age of big data. The moral dilemmas that arise occur in both ethical and 
ontological proximity to the subject, occur within digitally mediated self–other relationships, and 
are experienced as productive as well as repressive.5 
Furthermore, and echoing our earlier discussion about ethical concerns as a continuity from past 
to present surveillance practices, the notion of circulating and competing normativities is also well 
established within studies of surveillance. Many empirical studies of surveillance in action have 
highlighted how surveillance communicates value systems to the surveilled. Drawing on Scott’s 
(2011) analysis, these normativities could extend to appropriate bodily conduct, sexual 
relationships, working lives, economic and career opportunities, communicative disclosure, 
personal loyalties, as well as more fundamental issues concerning power, control and human rights. 
But these normativities would not just concern appropriate conduct in the intersubjective context 
but conduct which was convenient for big data surveillance: conduct, in other words, which is 
easily reducible to a data stream and conducted in conjunction with the big data surveillance 
assemblage. Indeed, normativities around surveillance include common understandings of how 
one may benefit from participation in a big data assemblage. 
In addition to the examples cited earlier from smart meters, education and health, detailed 
ethnographic work by Christina Nippert-Eng (2010), which charts individuals’ perceived ‘islands 
of privacy’, also approaches this issue. Nippert-Eng (2010) shows the efforts made by all kinds of 
individuals to maintain their boundaries between the self and the world, and how new social codes 
and norms are generated. Everyday materialities such as wallets, garden fences and medicine 
cabinets gain new significance in her analysis. Helen Nissenbaum (2010) offers the concept 
‘contextual integrity’ to similarly chart how different social contexts exhibit different privacy 
values. This is a phenomenon which is also well documented in relation to workplace surveillance, 
and is known as ‘meta-communication’ (Ball and Margulis, 2011). ‘Meta-communication’ refers 
to how the configuration of employee monitoring and the feedback of monitoring information to 
employees are infused with messages concerning managerial priorities and judgements as to 
appropriate behaviours (Stanton and Weiss, 2000). When monitored tasks are deemed more 
valuable or critical than non-monitored ones, workers will pay greater attention to those tasks and 
will afford greater importance to the behaviours that monitoring reinforces (Brewer, 1995). 
Similarly, in high-density CCTV areas, individuals worry more about being a victim of crime if 
they are aware of the cameras (Gill and Spriggs, 2005). Conflicts have arisen within consumer 
spaces such as restaurants when customers make use of hidden surveillance techniques such as 
‘google glass’ to take images of staff and other customers as well as the food and the setting. 
Upsetting the everyday norms of interaction, this has been interpreted as an invasion of privacy 
both for staff and other customers who have not knowingly consented or even have been lulled 
into a false sense of security by the establishment banning such devices, which are not always 
detectable.6 
We therefore argue that it is important to consider the normativities which are implicit within and 
reinforced by forms of big data surveillance as, when encountered, they will interweave in the 
subject’s lifeworld and intersect with other normativities. It is the enactment and instantiation of 
those norms which is deemed valuable to big data surveillance. It begins at, returns to and 
constitutes a horizon of being against which all are in profile. 
The Big Data Surveilled Body-subject 
Ultimately, big data surveillance means that we need to think about the surveilled subject 
differently. We propose a new focus on the lived normativities which stem from bodily 
engagement in sociotechnical practices and which render big data surveillance more or less 
proximal to the subject. To engage as a big data surveilled subject is to come to terms with the 
proximity of the competing normativities which arise in digitally mediated settings and to come to 
terms with the manipulation and normative steering to which one is subject. Such a phenomenon 
can be studied in the flux and flows of everyday life, without necessarily directly referring to 
surveillant data streams. Examples of such phenomena might concern notions of revitalization and 
empowerment in relation to one’s health and wellbeing or one’s centrality in a virtual community 
of sportspeople that might be achieved by uploading one’s step, mood, run or cycle data to the 
cloud. Other normativities might emerge around sustainable living if one’s family home was wired 
up to the smart grid and its energy consumption shared with one’s neighbours, local authority and 
energy supplier. Within these milieux one is likely to find traces of surveilled subjectivity which 
can then form the basis of a discussion around compliance, resistance and politics. What are the 
minuscule doubts, dilemmas and hunches – so often experienced as visceral sensations – around 
these practices? What questions do subjects have about them and by what rationales do they 
comply? And to what extent are there patterns within and between different domains of practice in 
relation to how these normativities are circulated, mobilized and lived? 
A focus on normativities, then, adds an analytical layer where there is a lack of direct or conscious 
inter-relationality between the surveilled subject and the surveillant other. Perhaps this is the 
reason why big data surveillance processes are so difficult to identify at the level of the subject. It 
is a fragment of a relation, distal and heavily intermediated, but it can also have a sudden, non-
negotiable and destabilizing presence if attention is drawn to it. Negotiation, reflection and 
engagement are required at the level of the self. Those moments where surveillance is rendered 
interactional, rather than proximal, are the moments when it becomes noticed as such. This may 
be the point at which one asserts ‘I am not the person you are looking for’; ‘I am not the recalcitrant 
worker’; ‘I am not the flawed consumer’ – ‘I have nothing to hide, I am who I am’. Those moments 
of noticing – however momentary they are – become moments of connection, as the individual 
realizes their place in a much larger infrastructure and notices the identity category to which they 
are assigned, and when they assert that they are self-not-other. They signify an involuntary 
entanglement within the infrastructures which constitute everyday life. ‘Nothing to hide nothing 
to fear’ becomes a statement of self-worth, a defiant speech-act which re-establishes ontological 
security and allows the everyday to continue. Realizations of one’s engagement with surveillance 
can be profound as the terms of engagement are revealed. These terms are rarely one’s own. This 
is why a focus on normativity is so crucial. 
This additional analytical layer also strongly interpellates developments in body studies which 
concern a move towards body as process, body as assemblage and embodied trans-subjectivity 
(Blackman, 2012; Blackman and Venn, 2010). The types of digitally mediated activities which 
instantiate big data practices articulate the lived body in new ways, creating new registers of 
bodysubjectivity deeply embedded in everyday worlds, which are sometimes difficult to observe 
but which powerfully bind humans to the relations in which they are immersed. This emphasis on 
proximity and normativity reinforces the argument that the body is a central site when studying 
surveillance. It is the pinnacle of proximity and, through its co-constitutive relationship with the 
world, recursive reiterations of the lived and social body have the potential to inscribe, incorporate 
and forge meaning around digital phenomena such as big data surveillance. As Merleau-Ponty 
argued, one’s physical body, ‘le corps propre’, is not merely an object, but also an enduring 
condition of experience and perception. He referred to the body as ‘la chair du monde’, an ontology 
of ‘the flesh of the world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 1968). Ball (2005, 2009) and Di Domenico and 
Ball (2011) already highlight the embodied, intersubjective and contested way in which the subject 
is exposed to surveillance. Elsewhere we have argued that the subject is always already exposed 
to surveillance, because exposure can be addressed as a pre-relational default state (Di Domenico 
and Ball, 2011; Harrison, 2008). The subject is perpetually turned to the exterior and open to the 
other, available to be read and signifying but beyond intentionality, will and purpose. Embodied 
actions are available to be read by others, even when alone, because of the existing representations 
which are circulating. A second point relates to how the body is contested terrain in surveillance 
processes. For those who surveill, it is the source of truth about the individual (Ball, 2005). The 
more of the lived body that is remediated into information flows the more value is created for those 
who want that information (Bolter and Grusin, 2000; Waldby, 2000). For those who surveill, the 
impulse is to surface and capture lived interiority to denote truth, authenticity and value within the 
surveillance dispositif (Ball, 2005, 2009; Lianos, 2003). But at times this may not coincide with 
an individual’s lived, embodied identity and their sense of morality, and this is how the contestation 
arises. For example, reactions to the Snowden revelations demonstrate that such noticing 
immediately produced constructions of collectivity, where one’s subjection to surveillance 
signified a subjection which is greater than that of the individual alone. Apart from the obvious 
resignation and frustration of being subject to such scrutiny, there is a feeling that a trans-subjective 
sense of that particular surveillance practice has emerged which will then inform shared embodied 
noticings and renewed sensitization of the proximity of surveillance in all kinds of settings: a 
collective version of the embodied sensing theorized by Merleau-Ponty (1968). 
Conclusion: Towards a Politics of Proximity 
Big data has its origins in business information use. As a set of practices, it has now diffused into 
both private and public settings and is used to target products and services more efficiently as well 
as to manage infrastructures. We have argued that this has a set of continuities with surveillance 
practices from the recent and more distant past, both in terms of ethical reactions to it and in terms 
of the power structures it sustains. Big data enables corporations, through experimentation with 
analytics, and the offering of applications which gather data on individuals, not only to collect and 
store their details but also encourage them to live in new ways. As Savage (2013) has identified 
and Klauser and Albrechtslund (2014) have argued, data analytics are much more lively and in-
use, closely aligned with embodied life as it unfolds. By using the notions of proximity which arise 
in Merleau-Ponty (1968) and Levinas (1969), and by synthesizing extant empirical work on the 
experience of surveillance, we have suggested that, in an age of big data, where devices stream 
huge amounts of information about individuals to organizations, the surveilled subject can be 
understood in a new way. We suggest that the socio-technical practices that accompany these data 
streams can instantiate new normativities about how life should be lived in order to feed those data 
streams so that subjects may incorporate new practices into their embodied lives. Examining the 
depth and nature of individuals’ normative engagement with these new socio-technical practices, 
particularly around their capacity to collect information, can reveal the lived subtleties and flows 
in subjection to surveillance. Further, using Merleau-Ponty’s work on the embodied, sense-based 
nature of proximal social relations, we have suggested that prior to surveillance being ‘noticed’ as 
such, surveillant relations are rendered proximal by these normativities, which circulate as they are 
incorporated into the lived practices of subjects. The socio-technical practices which enable big 
data are diffuse and ubiquitous and so considering surveillance relations as proximal a priori 
relativizes surveillant encounters in the flows of everyday living. Our focus on proximity sidesteps 
some of the difficulties associated with establishing connectivity between watcher and watched 
via a ‘gaze’, which is perhaps dictated by ‘traditional’ surveillance theory (Lyon, 2007). It also 
sidesteps the confounding analytical move which suggests that a lack of awareness of surveillance 
denotes no subjection to it. We suggest that, while we may examine surveillance practices and 
identity categories as having a direct link, this link is often accomplished through a heavily 
intermediated chain of actors. As such, to take this conceptual article into the empirical realm, we 
suggest that a focus on shifts in normativities surrounding socio-technical practices and 
relationships with devices could be illuminating andopenupspace for newpoliticsaswell. When 
methodsof big data become established in everyday life, the new proximal, relational and practice-
based norms which emerge are worthy of study. 
Notes 
1. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datasimpact-in-the-
world.html?pagewanted¼all&_r¼0 and http://www. bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01rt4c7 (accessed 8 
April 2014). 
2. Lyon (2001: 2) defines surveillance as: ‘The collection and processing of personal data, whether 
identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered’, 
which ‘does not usually involve embodied persons watching each other’. 
3. See: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/03/how-activitytrackers-remove-rights-
personal-data (accessed 17 February 2015). 
4. We note here that Merleau-Ponty is moving towards a post-Cartesian conceptualization of the body, or 
at least he speaks of the body’s ability to incorporate and constitute the social simultaneously. We also 
acknowledge that Merleau-Ponty’s work is foundational in the work of Crossley (2001), who clearly 
articulated a post-Cartesian body sociology. Within surveillance studies, the emphasis has always been 
on the post-Cartesian body, with reference made to the work of, inter alia, Hayles (1999) and Grosz 
(1994). 
5. We acknowledge that spaces of ethics, resistance, play and engagement are to be afforded in our 
analysis. We also understand that subjects who generate information through their personal devices, 
internet activities and participation in social networks, and who experience the thrill of self-exposure 
(McGrath, 2004), are still ‘immaterial labourers’ for those organizations which possess the means of 
surveillance (Lazzarato, 1996; Murakami Wood and Ball, 2013). 
6. An account of a dispute over using ‘Google Glass’ in a restaurant is reported in the Seattle Times: 
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/allyoucaneat/2013/11/26/diner-using-google-glass-asked-to-leave-
restaurant/ (accessed 27 November 2013). 
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